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I. INTRODUCTION; THE TAKINGS JUNKYARD
A. The character of state/local resource regulations: a
lightening overview.
Run-of-the mill takings cases have historically arisen 
from the exceedingly pedestrian circumstances of local 
regulation. The doctrine is a well-known morass, which scholars 
periodically vow to clean up, more or less fruitlessly
B. Federal judicial reactions
For many years, higher-level federal courts left 
state/local takings issues alone, and major takings issues were 
left to be hashed out in the states. In recent years this 
pattern has changed, with a flurry of new Supreme Court takings 
cases.
C. The Federal regulatory dimension
A somewhat less noted phenomenon has been increased
1
federal judicial "takings" supervision over federal legislation 
as well as state and local.
D. Some questions posed:
1) What are the sources of new activism?
2) Are the "takings" cases in the context of federal 
legislation simply deja vu, or a new departure?
II. SOURCES AND HISTORY
A. "Takings” and property regimes.
"Takings" cases and doctrines have to be understood in 
relationship to underlying theories of property.
B. Why have property?
Three major theories of property are, roughly speaking, 
libertarian, civic republican and utilitarian. I will 
concentrate on utilitarian views, since I think these dominate 
much of our law and thinking about property.
C. Implications of utilitarian property
1) Property as an institution encourages investment 
and careful use of resources, but this means that property rights 
should be relatively stable.
2) Property rights are not always well-defined, with 
the result that property uses sometimes cause externalities or 
spillover effects. Regulation is ofen justified as preventing
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externalities, or in older parlance, preserving "public rights." 
Externalities take several forms; the most important for 
regulation are common pool externalities.
D. The evolutionary character of property rights & 
regulatory regimes
Property rights tend to evolve from less-defined to 
more sharply-defined as resources grow scarcer; the regulation of 
externalities also evolves, and in a similar pattern.
III. REGULATION, PUBLIC RIGHTS AND "TAKINGS" PROBLEMS
A. Practical problems in regulation
1. The usual stuff: Regulators may have dumb ideas, 
or take graft, or get "captured" by the regulated entities.
2. The "piggy-back commons problem": uses of property 
may use common resources in ways that cause external harms to 
others (e.g. smoking, waste disposal in air or water), but by the 
time these are noticed as problems, property-owners think that 
their property rights include the infliction of externalities on 
others. Hence regulation faces the obstacles of entrenched 
entitlements; the purported baseline property right includes a 
piggy-backed externality.
3. The uncertain hopes of planning: Advance planning
is often cited as an antidote to entrenchment, by signalling that 
particular property uses may be subject to regulation in the 
future; but planning may or may not work to give the proper
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B. Regulating the regulators— another evolutionary  process.
Regulation may have external effects or other 
problematic effects of its own (e.g. exclusionary zoning or NIMBY 
regulation may cause external harms to neighboring communities). 
Hence regulatory activities too may require supervision, just as 
property owners' uses require supervision by regulation.
C. The Federal courts and the evolution of "regulating the
regulators”— judicial supervision in context.
There are a number of institutions that have policed or 
supervised local and state regulatory bodies— notably state 
courts and state legislation. Perhaps for this reason, federal 
judicial supervision was very low-key for a number of years, but 
now has staged a great resurgence with the recent flurry of 
Supreme Court takings cases. The larger context of "regulating 
the regulators," however, also includes federal legislative 
supervision of state and local measures, e.g. in the major air 
and water pollution control acts.
IV. "TAKINGS" CLAIMS AGAINST FEDERAL ACTIONS
A. The great scope of federal resource management
Federal legislative resource management has been 
important in the public lands for many years, but particularly in 
recent years, with the turn to conservationist approaches.
signals.
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Federal legislation has also massively entered resource 
management through other routes, e.g. legislation for pollution 
control, mining regulation, wildlife management etc.
B. New role of the Federal claims court:
As federal resource management has expanded, takings 
challenges against the federal government have centered on the 
federal court of claims.
1. familiar substantive claims
Claims court cases have a familiar substantive base, 
and tend to revolve around land uses— e.g. challenges to 
regulations about mining, wetlands, wildlife habitat. Like the 
subjects of state/local regulation, land uses subject to federal 
legislation also frequently involve a "piggy-backed" common 
resource (air, water, wildlife) associated with the land use.
2. unfamiliar institutional character
Institutionally, the takings claims against federal
legislation are quite different. Congress is very large and 
diverse, by comparison with local or even state legislative 
bodies, and should have different institutional strengths and 
weaknesses. E.G., Congress may be able to marshall more 
investigative resources and scientific sophisticaton than state 
and local bodies. But since there are many states and 
localities, citizens have more choice among legislative 
"packages” at the state or local level. "Capture" as a problem 
thus might take on different characteristics as between federal
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or state/local legislatures.
C. Do the feds need a different kind of takings discussion?
The above issues suggest that "takings" challenges to 
federal legislation might best analysed in a different way from 
state or local legislation; but the claims court to date appears 
not to have provided any such analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
1) Federal legislative and judicial supervision over 
state/local legislation was predictable from the evolution of 
property rights and regulations
2) Federal judicial supervision over federal legislation 
perhaps also predictable, given the massive federal entry into 
resource management
3) But federal legislation emerges from a quite different 
institutional setting from state/local regulation, and those 
differences call for independent consideration, and perhaps a 
different takings jurisprudence— something we may not get, in any 
systematic way, from an Article I court.
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